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BOOK REVIEW
GIVING WAY: MARTHA NUSSBAUM AND THE MORALITY OF
PRIVATION

JOHN LEWISt

Women andHuman Development: The CapabiliiesApproach. Martha C.
Nussbaum. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp xxi-312.
I. PRACTICAL RELEVANCE
Martha C. Nussbaum has for decades studied and taught philosophy with a
view to its practical relevance. Ancient philosophers were concerned most of all
with care for the soul and for beneficial effects upon human life, and we can
learn from them in addressing deep problems faced by people today.' In her
present work, Women and Human Development. The CapabiliiesApproach, Nussbaum
adds to her earlier attempts to formulate practical feminist political principles by
focusing on the needs of women in developing countries, especially India. Her
approach to the problems she details is moral, political and constitutional: "The

t Assistant Professor of History at Ashland University.
1. Nussbaum acknowledges that she and Amartya Sen in 1986 recognized the "striking resemblance" between her ideas of Aristotle and Sen's of economics. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human
Development: The CapabilitiesApproarh 11 (Cambridge 2000) ("IlHD"). But Sen never grounded the capabilities approach "in the Marxian/Aristotelian idea of truly human functioning that plays a central role in my
argument." WIHD at 13. She claims to have begun her approach "independently of Sen's work through
thinking about Aristotle's ideas of human functioning and Marx's use of them." WIHD at 70. The approach
is presented alongside Aristotle in Nature, Funtion, and Capabili_*:Aristotle on PoliticalDistribution, in Julia
Annas and Robert H. Grimm, eds, Oxford Studies inAndent Philosophy 145 (Clarendon 1988).
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aim of the project as a whole is to provide the philosophical underpinning for an
account of basic constitutional principles that should be respected and implemented by governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what respect for
human dignity requires. ' 2 Ultimately her proposals are intended to serve as a
moral core for a set of "constitutional guarantees" acceptable to nations with
3
disparate customs and laws.
Nussbaum's use of ancient philosophy to develop her modern program
leaves room for many levels of critique, but this review will focus on one aspect
of her project. Given that she defines her proposals in political terms and states
that governments under various systems of law should be concerned with the
implementation of these proposals, we must ask: what are the general political
and constitutional implications of her proposals? 4 In particular, what are the
implications for people whom Nussbaum does not talk about, who do not have
a voice in her consensus or her narrative? These people are a substantial portion
of the human race.
Nussbaum's focus is on women who are poor, oppressed by religious and
cultural customs, or at the mercy of domineering husbands. She is explicit that
her proposals will require massive redistribution of wealth as well as fundamental changes to cultural conditions, although the nature and amount of that redistribution are left unspecified, and she concludes that redistribution alone cannot
do the job.5 But Nussbaum omits entirely the interests of the very people who
have achieved human flourishing and who are to produce and provide the resources necessary to her plan.6 These omissions are not only a case of an author
setting necessary limits to the scope of a book, but are significant in evaluating
her entire approach. Justice demands that the interests of those people be considered when evaluating Nussbaum's plan.
To consider these implications, this review will examine several aspects of
her program, including the normative standards she uses, her methods of deriving her proposals, the unstated single conception of the good that underlies her
plan, and the implications that her proposals hold for people in developed na2. IVHD at 5. Her proposals are to "provide a basis for central constitutional principles that citizens have a right to demand from their governments." WHD at 12. Her program is intended to provide
"the underpinning for a set of constitutional guarantees in all nations." IVHD at 35.
3. See [IHD at 35, 74, 105. For a list of Nussbaum's works on the capabilities approach, see
IHD at 34 n 2.
4. An added impetus for this review is found in the actual use of such ideas by international agencies today. The capabilities approach, as pioneered by Amartya Sen, has been influential in the United
Nations Development Programme's Human Development Reports for 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997.
See WHD at 70 n 66.
5. Her proposals are "intended to be compatible with several different accounts of distribution
above the threshold." IPD at 12. "We need to ask what constraints there ought to be on economic
growth" and what governments should provide. WHD at 33. An approach to problems in India must
consider the real conditions of poor people; "it is not simply a matter of waving a wand and saying even
'universal compulsory primary education."' IPHD at 29.
6. I could not find any reference in the book to a concern for who is to provide these resources.
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tions. Several basic conclusions, including subjectivity on descriptive and normative levels, deontology, enforced economic redistribution, and emotional idealism, are ultimately unavoidable with respect to her project. These conclusions
should give pause to theorists and practitioners charged with implementing her
proposals.
Before describing and evaluating her approach, a preliminary point is necessary. What does Nussbaum mean by "constitutional"? The question is important
because ancient political thinkers did not have the same view of constitutions as
we do and attempts to apply ancient principles to modem nations must acknowledge these differences. Ancient political systems were generally designed
for small, independent communities; both Plato and Aristotle set explicit limits
to the proper size of a polis. 7 Early political philosophers intertwined moral and
political issues; the prime determinant of the constitution of an ancient city was
the moral health of its citizens.
But this is not what we mean by a constitution today. Unlike ancient constitutions such as Aristotle's Athenian Constitution,the United States Constitution is
a prescriptive document. It is the written law of the land and the government
enforces it. A constitutional change is not primarily a change in the moral standards of the community but a law that sets the basic parameters for political and
legal functions. Nussbaum can be quite unclear about whether she is dealing
with a constitution qua moral system or a constitution qua legal standard. She
seems to assume that every moral good should become a constitutional guarantee. This review, however, will accept Nussbaum's stated intention that her proposals become constitutional guarantees by governments, and consider her proposals as constitutional in the modern sense. Nussbaum supports this interpretation with multiple comparisons of the American and Indian constitutions, and
references to legal cases in India.8 Ultimately, she intends her proposals to be
implemented politically, which is "to a large extent the job of citizens in each
nation." 9

IT. UNDERSTANDING THE "CAPABILITIES APPROACH"):
'THRESHOLD" AND 'QUALITY"

STANDARDS

We begin with a basic presentation of the capabilities approach, which
Nussbaum condenses in her introduction and expands in her narrative. 10 She
7. For a size limit based on the ability of a single herald to address the whole people, see Aristotle,
Polkks 7.4.7 1326b2-8 (Harvard 1959) (H. Rackham, trans). For the optimum size as 5040 citizens, see
Plato, las 737E-738B; Plato,pasim, in The DialoguesofPlato (Clarendon 4th ed 1964) (B. Jowett, trans).
8. For direct comparisons between the American and Indian constitutions, see, for example, WIHD
at 39, 55. For mention of India's "promising constitutional tradition," see WHD at 9. For accounts of three
legal cases, see WIND at 169-74.
9. WIHD at 105.
10. WHD at 4-11. For the essentials of the approach, see WIHD at 70-96.
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adopts the ancient ideal offloudshing as an aspiration proper to human life." To
flourish requires that a person choose to actualize certainfncions-a person may
read, do a job, experience sexual satisfaction, or live healthily to a normal life
span. To develop these functions requires that a person have the capabiliy of
doing so; Nussbaum elevates these capabilities to the central focus of her approach.
The capabilities are dependent upon certain physical, emotional and cultural
requirements, without which Nussbaum claims there is no actual ability to function: without adequate shelter one will be unable to flourish; without schools
one will not learn to read; if one suffers genital mutilation then sexual satisfaction is impossible; without health care one will not live to a normal life span; if
one is beaten then one's emotions will not develop normally. Her approach recognizes that certain material resources are necessary to a person's ability to
achieve the functions proper to a flourishing human being.' 2 Nussbaum holds
that one of the central purposes of politics is to provide these resources where
3
they are needed.'
Nussbaum has gathered the "Central Human Functional Capabilities" into a
list that is expressly open-ended and incomplete; in various works she has
amended the list and has left it open to change.' 4 The mutability of the list is
essential to her method, given her claim that the basic derivation of these items
is from a consensus. Her "capabilities" extend from basic needs of life (health,
nourishment, shelter) to the length of life (to live a "normal" life span), bodily
integrity ("being able to be secure against assault'), the senses, imagination and
thought ("being able to use the senses, to imagine, think and reason'), emotions
("being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves," "to
grieve, to experience longing"), practical reason ("being able to form a conception of the good'), play ("being able to laugh') and the capability to participate
politically. A recent addition is environmental concerns ("being able to live with
5
concern for... animals, plants and the world of nature").'
Nussbaum's distinction between the capability to do these things and the
actualized function 6 is vital because she claims to support human freedom by

11. For 'Two Women Trying to Flourish," see WHD at 15-24. I/HD at 31: "Certain basic aspirations to human flourishing are recognizable across differences of class and context."
12. To exercise one's rights "requires material and institutional resources." WI-D at 54.
13. She also attributes this position to Aristotle in Nature, Function andCapabili' (cited in note 1).
14. For the "current version of the list," see WHD at 78-81. For earlier versions, see Martha C.
Nussbaum, Sex and Soda! Justice 41-42 (Oxford 1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female
Human Beings, in Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, eds, Women, Culture, andDevelopment: A Study of
Human Capabilities61, 83-85 (Clarendon 1995). A difference between Nussbaum and Sen is his unwillingness to list the capabilities.
15.
WHD at 78-80.
16. Nussbaum distinguishes "the capability or opportunity to be healthy and actual healthy functioning." I-ID at 14.
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limiting her proposals to providing the capability.17 It is politically and morally
mandatory, she claims, that each person have the resources necessary to achieve
these functions, but the choice to achieve a given function is up to the individual.' 8 However, although she acknowledges the necessity of the massive redistribution of wealth, she does not discuss the mechanism and implications of redistribution. To provide the necessary resources will require active redistribution of
the products of people who function successfully. This is true even though
Nussbaum steadfastly omits any discussion of the facts that producing these
goods is an aspect of the flourishing of others, and that her approach makes
those with fewer resources dependent on that flourishing.
The capabilities are discussed according to two basic levels. The first level is
a "threshold level of each capability," which is the basic level required for any
person anywhere. 19 This first level represents the biological needs of the human
organism: "the body that labors is in a sense the same body all over the world,
and its needs for food and nutrition and health care are the same." 20 But the
"threshold" also establishes the level "beneath which it is held that truly human
functioning is not available." 21 This is described as "the level at which a person's
capability becomes what Marx called 'truly human,' that is, 2vorthy of a human
being."22 She intends to go beyond the "merely comparative use of the capability
space" and to use "the idea of a threshold level of capabilities," presumably by
recognizing the needs of human beings apart from equality with others. 23
The second level of capability is based on equally. "comparisons of life quality" between people and between nations. She claims that the threshold level is
more important than equality; getting people above the threshold level should
be the social goal, and equality is the "weaker use" of the capabilities approach. 24
Despite this distinction, she tends to evaluate matters by using equality as a
standard. She does this in the first two sentences of her introduction: "Women
in much of the world lack support for fundamental functions of a human life
[threshold level]. They are less well nourished than men, less healthy, more vulnerable to physical violence and sexual abuse [equality level]." 2 Given that both
the content of the capabilities list and the standard for judging what belongs on
the list are open-ended, she shifts between the "threshold" and the "equality"
standards, especially when calling for economic redistribution: "And making
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See section 6.
WIHD at 87-88.
1I-ID at 6.
WHD at 22.
IWHD at 6.

22.

JVHD at 73 (emphasis in original).

23.
24.

WIHD at 12.
IPI-D at 6. "The notion of a threshold is more important in my account than the notion of full

capability equality." VHD at 12.
25. IPHD at 1.1 am calling equality a "standard" because she uses it to determine the level of capability present
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capabilities the goal entails promoting for all citizens a greater measure of material equality than exists in most societies, since we are unlikely to get all citizens
above a minimum threshold of capability for truly human functioning without
26
some redistributive policies."
To evaluate her proposals we must ask whether Nussbaum is basing her
formulation on the threshold or the equality standard at any particular point. She
is often not clear on this. The importance of this issue is due to the use of equality to define the normative terms of her capabilities, often used to justify greater
redistribution. Despite her claims that threshold takes precedence over equality,
she sets the tone for the reader's emotional engagement by beginning her book
with four pages describing inequalities between men and women.27 The reader
may be right to conclude that the passionate desire for equality is driving Nussbaum's own narrative, a point that is not lost if the purpose of these opening
pages is to motivate the reader in the same way. If this is true, then the desire for
redistribution may be more central to her approach than she admits, a point
further supported by her elevation of matters of poverty over matters of sex
28
when it supports her argument.
IH. THE LIST: SUBJECTiVITY IN DESCRIPTION AND N NORM
The importance of Nussbaum's list is not only in its specific content but in
her methods of deriving that list. She stresses this point to defend her development of an actual list: "Like any universal approach, [the capabilities approach]
is only valuable if developed in a relevant way: so we need to worry not just
about the structure of the approach, but also about how to flesh out its content." 29 The method she presents has implications for how the proposals would
be implemented constitutionally. Nussbaum begins her discussion with what she
calls an intuition and a judgment. 30 "The basic intuition from which the
capability approach begins, in the political arena, is that certain human abilities
exert a moral claim that they should be developed." 31 Her defense of philosophy
as a means of examining a resulting belief is stated here and elsewhere.32 But
26. WIHD at 86. "But the provision of a threshold level of capability, exigent though that goal is,
may not suffice for justice, as I shall elaborate further later, discussing the relationship between the social
minimum and our interest in equality." WI-ID at 75.
27. A few pages later, Nussbaum observes that her narrative method has an "implicit emphasis on
the political importance of the imagination and the emotions." W-ID at 15. By implication, the examples of
poor women are intended to strike the reader emotionally.
28. Considering feminist philosophy, Nussbaum holds that "problems peculiar to middle-class
women should give way to [problems of poor women]." W-ID at 7.
29. WHD at 71.
30. Nussbaum equates her own "judgments" with "intuitions." She claims that her own approach
does not "appear to me to have an unacceptable amount of reliance on intuition-or, as I prefer to say,
judgment." WHD at 212.
31.
WHD at 83. Nussbaum pointedly never asks if every moral "intuition" supported by a consensus should be enacted by government force. It is difficult to see how such an assumption could fail to
transfer moral claims to "the usual contest of power." WHD at 300.
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means of examining a resulting belief is stated here and elsewhere. 32 But what
are the descriptive and normative aspects of the list and the process by which it
is derived?33
Nussbaum does not discuss exactly how the list should be developed and
implemented in various national systems. Her own "moral core" is supposed to
cut across such peculiarities. Nussbaum remains unclear as to how hundreds of
millions of people should mold the list in consensus meetings and national legislatures according to their own intuitions, and what the implications would be for
political constitutions. This question is exacerbated by the fact that she speaks of
her project in two ways: as her own philosophical work to develop the approach
and as a project in which other people are building a consensus. 34 This is related
to the two ways in which she speaks of values, as either formulated through
philosophy or as the product of consensus; we will return to this issue below.
But she provides an example of how her own list was derived by revealing how
a particular capability was added to the list. In essence, the list of capabilities is
derived by consensus and the list changes as the consensus changes. This subordinates the content of the list to the values of the consensus.
Nussbaum exposes the derivation of Central Human Functional Capability
number eight, "Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation
to animals, plants, and the world of nature." This capability, she observes, was
not on her initial list:
[It] was added at the insistence of Scandinavian participants in the project, who
said that this was something without which, for them, no life could be truly human. As we reflected, it became clear that many of us also held such a view,
thought we hadn't theorized it as elaborately as had our Scandinavian participants.
There were participants from South Asia who never thought this very important,
who actively disliked animals, and who thought it a kind of romantic Green Party
flourish to put this on the list when people were suffering. On the other side, as
time went on, there were people who questioned the anthropocentricity of the entire list, judging that we had no reason to give the human capabilities priority over
other capabilities, and objecting to the idea that other species would be brought in
only on account of their relationship to the human. It seems to me that whole
question is quite unresolved at this point, and we have not yet achieved a political

32. We need philosophy "to help us think through our own intuitive ideas, to criticize them, and to
figure out which ones we are willing to hold on to." IWIHD at 299. See also Martha C. Nussbaum, Culivaling
Humatd!:A ClasicalDefense of Reform in LiberalEducation (Harvard 1997), especially Chapter One, "Socratic
Self-Examination." The life of questioning "is not just somewhat useful; it is an indispensable part of a
worthwhile life." Id at 21.
33. Nussbaum claims that an "international feminism that is going to have any bite" needs "descriptive and normative concepts adequate to that task" of crossing "boundaries of culture, nation, religion,
race, and class." W/HD at 34.
34. On the nature of her project, compare "my proposal is intended to be compatible with several
different accounts," lVHD at 12, with the "project" discussed in the block quote below.
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35

Given Nussbaum's desire that her list be viewed as a "proposal put forth in
a Socratic fashion," 36 the reader may wonder how this compares to Socrates's
own means of examination. In short, it is difficult to see Socrates relying on a
consensus to determine the "moral core" of anything.37 Nussbaum's list is rather
derived by a process of intersubjectivity, in the sense that the persons who are
present pay attention to each other's emotional expressions while relying on
38
certain shared premises and ignoring others.
To determine the exact nature of the intersubjective process in Nussbaum's
project would require more information and is beyond the scope of this review.

The important point is that the values on the list are based upon the values of
the participants in the consensus, and those values are communitarian.3 9 The
adherents place a strong emphasis on cooperation and agreement, and exhibit a
willingness to change their views to achieve a consensus. Those who do not
agree with these premises would not be present, would not admit that these
matters are properly the concern of the community, would not admit that they
"also held such a view," would not think they or others should be required to
pay for these proposals, and would have no part in the consensus.0 Although
Nussbaum might claim to step beyond these normative considerations by formulating the capabilities in terms of a threshold based on facts, by molding the
threshold to a consensus she supports the communitarian ideal. Those who
41
oppose this ideal will be unheard.
This "consensus" method is not limited to mere political posturing; it is in35. WHD at 157. This item appears in Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings at 84
(cited in note 14). It is not in Sex andSodalIjustice.
36. WHD at 77.
37. "Tell me then, whether I am tight in saying that some opinions, and the opinions of some men
only, are to be valued, and that other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued." Plato,
Cito 47a, in Louise Ropes Loomis, ed, Plato 69 (Walter J. Black 1942) (B. Jowett, trans).
38. Nussbaum uses this approach to understand Greek ethics through tragedy, "in a theatre in
which each spectator looks across the staged action to the faces of his or her fellow citizens, as the assembled group, imagining, thinking, and feeling together." Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotle on Human Nature and
the Foundations of Etics, in J.E.J. Altham and Ross Harrison, eds, World,Mind, and Ethics: Essay on the Ethical
Philosopy of Bernard Williams 86, 98 (Cambridge 1995). This becomes a guide to understanding ourselves
today: "In the process of thinking thoughts like this [ike Sophocles in Athens], we are brought close to one
another." Martha Nussbaum, Hope, FearandSupense: A Chance to Focus on What Democrag leans, NY Newsday Sunday B4 (Nov 12, 2000).
39. Nussbaum makes this point in technical terms with respect to Plato's dialogue Philebur "An elenctic argument on that issue [sociability] would not be self-validating in the way the communal argument
is, since the mere fact of participating in personal self-examination would not by itself imply acceptance of
the fundamental importance of ties to others." Nussbaum, Aristotle on Human Nature at 101 (cited in note

38).
40. In research for this review, and in past discussions, I have been told by women that they have
"no time" for such projects, since they are busy earning a living, and they don't think it is tight that money
be taken and distributed in this way. These women will not attend the consensus meetings.
41.
For Nussbaum's approval of Harsanyi's "moral community," see section 6 and note 81 below.
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tegral to Nussbaum's own thoughts. For example, in comparing demographics
in India to other parts of the world, her primary concern is that "it might be
thought inappropriate to compare developed to developing countries," not
whether she thinks it is actually appropriate to do so or not.42 It is important for
a reformer in India not to announce that religion will be respected only so far as
it "lives up to a comprehensive liberal view of life" since this alienates people
who might become "allies." 43 Such an approach subordinates her proposals to
the prevailing cultural trends accepted by the consensus.
However, Nussbaum also claims that there are "universal values" existing
for all people at all times apart from such trends. Chapter One of Women and
Human Development is titled "In Defense of Universal Values," but her discussion
focuses on comparing her approach with that of other theorists rather than resolving the clash between the "consensus" and "universal values" within her
own program. 4 For example, Nussbaum takes a "universal" position by claiming, 'Pluralism and respect for difference are themselves universal values that
are not everywhere observed; they require a normative articulation and defense,
and that is one of the things I hope to provide in this project." 45 Despite any
denials, presumably "pluralism" is a universal value; if so, how does it differ
from cultural diversity, and why is it not on the list of capabilities?
Nussbaum also limits the application of her list. Given its proposals for literacy and education, "the list is intended for the modern world, rather than as
timeless." 46 The reader may wonder: If the capabilities proposed here are not
intended to last beyond the present moment, what is universal about them? Or
are the real universal values rather something over and above the list, and is the
list somehow circling those values without actually making them explicit? Is
there a hierarchical relationship between the universal values and those that are
not timeless? The possibility arises that "following the consensus" may be the
deepest value being exhorted here.
Nussbaum's position leads to a series of problems. On the one hand, she
denies that any single conception of the good is needed to accept her plan. On
the other hand, she claims that she has a "determinate normative conception. ' 47
On the one hand, she recognizes no hierarchy between items: "My view holds
that all the capabilities are equally fundamental, and does not announce a lexical
ordering among them." 48 On the other hand, her list of capabilities implies a
moral hierarchy: "practical reason" and "affiliation" are of "special importance"
42. WHD at 3 n 5.
43. 117HD at 179.
44. For example, she discusses arguments from culture, diversity and paternalism. WHD at 41-59.
45. WIHD at 32.
46. WVHD at 77.
47. WI-D at 6. Nussbaum claims a "philosophical project, whose aim is to develop a type of normative philosophical theory." WHD at 10.
48. WHD at 1Z
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since they "organize and suffuse all the others. '49 On the one hand, all the capabilities are equal and cannot be traded off: "We cannot satisfy the need for one
of them by giving a larger amount of another one. All are of central importance
and all are distinct in quality. '5 0 On the other hand, they can conflict, which
leads to the need to "balance" them "above the threshold," which can only occur "at a later stage of political choice, after basic constitutional values are
5
fixed." '
The question remains: Are there universal values in Nussbaum's world that
can be discerned apart from a consensus, or are values dependent upon an
agreement about them? In constitutional terms, the question becomes: Can anything be proposed as the moral core of a political constitution, or does philosophy have guidance to offer as to which things are proper and which are not?
Notwithstanding her claims, there is in practice clearly no limit to what could be
proposed and added to the list. There is not even a recognition that the list, as a
moral core of a political conception, is a statement of human values since other
animals form no constitutions. The basic purpose of a written political constitution, to define and limit the powers of government, is missing. The constitution
becomes a tool for the consensus to grasp whatever end those participating in
the consensus desire. The idea that the purpose of a constitution may be to put
the basic terms of government action beyond the reach of present-day opinion
polls is not discussed.
But there is another level to the problem. Beyond the matter of consensus
versus universal values, the very meaning of what is discussed is undefined. A
person could not determine objectively what living "in relation to" the world of
nature and with "concern" for animals even mean. Suppose a woman decided to
express her concern for wild animals by killing those that threaten her children
and her farm, since living "in relation" to nature means protecting herself from
those animals. This would directly impede the "capabilities" of other women
who wished to express their concern by protecting those animals globally. The
entire project would break down into competing claims, and there would be no
means of resolution. Who can say what one person's "concern" should consist
of? Nussbaum resolves the issue not by offering philosophical guidance as to
the proper scope of constitutional deliberations, but rather by adding items to
the list on some provisional basis, pending resolution of an undefined future
consensus. But again, if the particular laws about such a "concern" are local
matters, what is universal about the concern and what is the point of guaranteeing it constitutionally?
In fact, a "capability" is apotenialioy. Nussbaum holds that "the central ques-

49.
50.

WHD at 79, 82.
I-ID at 81. This is repeated from Nussbaum, Haman Capabilities, Female Human Beings
at 85-86

(cited in note 14).
51. WID at 211-12.
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tion of the capabilities approach is ... 'What is Vasanti [an Indian woman] actually able to do and to be?"' 5 2 Absent evidence (or witnesses) of physical abuse, it
is simply impossible to tell whether a "capability" to develop a "function" is
present or not. Any claim apart from evidence that the capability has been impaired is arbitrary and ultimately unverifiable. The same subjectivity, and similar
moral and legal problems, permeate items such as: "not dying prematurely, or
before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living"; "being able to use the
senses, to imagine, think and reason"; "being able to search for the ultimate
meaning of life in one's own way"; "not having one's emotional development
blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety"; "being able to form a conception
of the good"; "to have the capability for both justice and friendship. '53 In each
case there would be no way to determine the existence of such states apart from
the fact of physical assaults or restraints--and if those physical factors are present, there is no reason for such clauses. Moreover, Nussbaum does not explain
why the countries that best exhibit the conditions necessary for such flourishing
do not include such items in their constitutions. She simply assumes that those
constitutions are imperfectm
The subjectivity of the list is further revealed in the use of normative terms.
What is a "normal" length of life? "Adequate" shelter? "Truly human" imagin55
ing? The "ultimate" meaning of life? "Overwhelming" fear? "Good" health?
Nussbaum calls upon normative standards continually without specifying how
they should be understood, or what concept of the good gives rise to them.5 6 As
the moral core of constitutional guarantees based on an open-ended consensus,
some means are required to show how these terms are to be defined.
For example, capability number one, "being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length," does not define "normal." We must assume that
such terms are to be understood first against a "threshold" standard, presumably
on the most basic biological level as well as against the requirements for a
flourishing life. But what is a "normal threshold" for the length of life? Is it
what is normal to an Indian in a province that has rejected western science, or to
a resident of New York City? Ultimately "normal" must mean normal as made
possible by the advances of western science, and any advance in that science
raises the standard of what is normal. In other words, the norms are defined by
those who create the advancements.
An example is needed here. If a drug company develops a cure for a dangerous disease, the standard for what is normal rises to match the new ability to
52.

WVHD at 71.

53. WIHD at 78-80.
54. See, for example, WEHD at 39.
55. WHD at 78-79.
56. WIHD at 132 discusses normative terms in a criticism of Brandt but offers no solution that
overcomes Nussbaum's own desire to admit differing conceptions of the good, respect the practices of
various religions, and yet restrain coercive practices.
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fight the disease. This is human progress. But every such advance then activates
the equality standard, since those who have the medicine are now unequal to
those that do not. This would lead to an immediate claim on those who have
produced that advance. The drug company will be bound to provide the new
drug to all of those who need it, and if they do not, they are depriving those
who suffer from the disease of their constitutional guarantee to live life to a
"normal" length. Not until everyone in the world is equal in their capability to
live to a "normal" length of life will those who are able to live longer satisfy
their obligations to the poor. But again, how is this "normality" to be determined for billions of people? And what, if any, protections are to be available
for those who actually produce such advances? Why should they produce anything if they are to become the targets of lawsuits based on the constitutional
guarantees embodied in the capabilities list?
Despite the presence of many items that are necessary to human life and
that rational individuals should want to attain, as a basis for legally enforced
political rights, Nussbaum's list of "functional capabilities" is deeply subjective,
emotionally conditioned, and arbitrarily derived. It should be a matter of pause
to political and legal scientists that such a list, and its method of derivation,
might become constitutional standards affecting billions of people. Those who
reject the politicalenactment of such a moralplatform will be justified in rejecting
her plan, even if they value the specifics of the platform as personal and moral
aspirations.
IV. MORAL DEONTOLOGY AS THE COMMON CONCEPTION OF THE
GOOD
According to Nussbaum, the "principle of each person's capability" is a reinterpretation of the "principle of each person as an end."'57 Within the narrow
limits of her focus on those in need, Nussbaum is adamant that no person or
group can properly use any individual as a means to an end:
And I shall argue that the capabilities in question should be pursued for each and
every person, treating each as an end and none as a mere tool of the ends of others: thus I adopt a ptindple of each person's capabiliy,based on a piincipk of each person as
58
end.

Nussbaum supports her political views with this claim to a moral focus on
the individual; capabilities are of "individual people, not, in the first instance, of
groups," and even families are granted no "moral standing" apart from individu-

57.
IHD at 188. See also WHD at 2, 5-6, 55-56, 73, 243, 247. Nussbaum does not mention Kant in
regard to this position, although a debt to the Foundaiois of ihe
Metaphysics ofMorals is clear.
58. IPHD at 5.
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als.59 However, once we broaden the discussion to include those people who are
to provide the resources for her plan, her idea of "each person as end" becomes
distinctly ambiguous, with two incompatible meanings that must be distinguished.
Individuals have often been used as the means to the ends of others. This is
undeniably an issue of justice and may require the forcible intervention of government authority to correct the injustice. When a child is sold into slavery or
given away in marriage to consummate an economic or family goal, Nussbaum
correctly identifies the child's position as a means to the ends of others and
properly denounces any such idea or practice. To subordinate the ends of some
individuals to those of others "is at the core of what exploitation is, to treat a
person as a mere object for the use of others." 60 This is how Nussbaum intends
the idea to be understood.
But there is another meaning of "end." When we factor into Nussbaum's
account those persons who must produce the material resources by which each
person is to be provided with the capability for shelter, food, and even play, the
ambiguity becomes glaring. Nussbaum sets this up in theoretical and practical
terms. In terms of an international feminist philosophy, "it seems right that
problems of poor working women in both developing and developed nations
should increasingly hold the center of the scene, and that problems peculiar to
middle-class women should give way to these." 61 More concretely, in terms of
international economics, her plan will require a massive redistribution of wealth
from those that have it to those who do not. Those to whom the resources are
given are to have the choice to reject them; to force them to attain proper functioning would fail to recognize their liberty, but no such choice is open to those
62
who are to provide the resources.
But what of the middle-class American woman's conception of the good
and her ability to realize her own flourishing state? What of her desire to send
her daughter to a private college and her willingness to work to save the necessary money? To opt out of providing the material values necessary for others is
not a choice open to her; her ideal must give way to Nussbaum's, if the consensus so agrees. As Nussbaum's universal values are ultimately subordinated to the
consensus so a woman of moderate means must subordinate her values to the
consensus. She has no moral right to send her daughter to college as long as a
girl in India has no high school, or at least until she helps pay for that high
school. The conclusion here is unavoidable: the American woman is in fact to
be treated as a means to the ends of those in need.
To consider "each woman as an end" comes to denote her position not as
59.
60.
61.
62.

WIHD at 188, 251.
WIHD at 73.
IVHD at 7. See also note 28 above.
WIHD at 87-88.
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an end of her own actions, but as an end of the actions of any anotherperson who
has the needed resources. In this way a poor woman becomes the end of any
woman who actually flourishes. This will be manifested in increasing taxes and
aid programs that are self-justified within the moral terms of the consensus. In
these terms it becomes clear that women most of all should question Nussbaum's approach. Should any woman attain the state of flourishing, she will face
a chorus of demands that she sacrifice her own flourishing to those who have
not attained such a state. She must be willing to work to support the gargantuan
bureaucracy that Nussbaum's schemes will require. A shifting set of demands
according to a shifting consensus will determine the amount of her sacrifice.
Enforcement will be by shifting legal interpretations and authorities. She must
accept all this without harboring antisocial feelings. This is the core of the capabilities approach as it relates to those who work to produce the necessary resources.
Nussbaum's plan is deontological for several reasons. Her ultimate ends are
derived from intuition and intersubjective consensus, and can never be solidified
objectively. Her demand for the means to provide those ends, however, makes
the duty to provide them categorical. The universal values at work reduce to a
"conception of the good" that is definite, immutable, must be accepted by all,
and may be imposed by force upon those who disagree. There is an unshirkable
responsibility to provide to others whatever resources are required by the list,
independent of its content. The subjective content of the capabilities, the normative terms by which they are formulated, and the means by which they are
derived leave only the central core moral ideal of duty to others as a standard for
human action. This sets the requirement that those who have the resources provide them and those who do not have them receive them. This is a duty, even
though Nussbaum does not state the word explicitly. No flourishing woman will
63
be able to choose otherwise.
Nussbaum can fall back on the government as the entity responsible for
providing whatever material values the consensus demands. But the government
can only get such resources through the enforced taxation of the wealth of its
citizens, and practical implementation of Nussbaum's plan will require a massive
increase in institutionalized expropriation in order to transfer the money on a
global basis. As part of the conceptual narrowing of her discussion, she frames
the discourse not in terms of whether such redistribution is to occur, but rather by
how much and what ape. A microcosm of this narrowing of the terms of the debate is seen in her consensus discussions, which argue not about whether such
proposals should be principles of constitutional law, but rather about what de-

63. "The very concept ofdut is already the concept of a necessitation (constraint) of free choice through
the law." Immanuel Kant, The Metaplysics of Morals 145 (Cambridge 1996) (Mary Gregor, trans). To constrain one's free choice to act exclusively within her conceptual and moral limits is precisely Nussbaum's
plan.

Giving Way: MarthaNussbaun and the Moraity ofPrivation 229

2001)

tails should be written into them.
The problems in Nussbaum's approach-such as whether the "universal
values" exist independently of a consensus or only once recognized in a consensus, or whether the items on the list are equally important or hierarchically related-result in a continual shift in the terms by which these values are recognized. Within the capabilities framework these questions may be ultimately unanswerable. Answering them may not even be necessary, given one's willingness
to subordinate one's own judgments to a consensus. Once people accept the
core moral idea that they have a duty to provide material resources to others as
the consensus decrees, and they carve this into law, the enforcement power of
the government will be unleashed against those who possess such resources.
The rest is a matter of time and degree.
V. DEMOCRACY, CONSENSUS AND COERCION, AND LIBERTY
Nussbaum claims to be in "complete agreement" with Amartya Sen that
"economic needs should not be met by denying liberty."64 She identifies liberty
with democracy, stressing the need for consensus within democratic governmental structures. "It would be inconsistent if a defender of the capabilities approach, with its strong role for democratic politics and political liberty, were to
seek an implementation strategy that bypassed the deliberations of a democratically elected parliament." On a national level, it is consistent for nations that
have developed such an approach to use "economic and other strategies to ensure compliance," but ultimately constitutional change in India will require that
the people of India choose to change. "Capabilities theory would be a prescrip65
tion for tyranny if it bypassed the nation."
Nussbaum imagines that once the process of building a consensus is completed, "[i]t can become the basis for international treaties and other documents
that may be adopted by nations and incorporated in that way into national, as
well as international, law.... We would be helped by the fact that we would
have the actual agreement of all citizens," and that the governments are
"elected" and "accountable to the people." 66 She claims that this would help her
plan pragmatically: it would be legitimated by the consensus. According to this
view, consensus in a democracy is sufficient for legitimacy and eliminates the
possibility of tyranny.
Nussbaum's democratic position is deeply problematic, both in theory and
in practice. Practically, an individual can be tyrannized by the majority as well as
by a minority; the majority that imposes its collective decision on an individual is
a group subordinating an individual. Like any group, there must be limits set to
64. WHD at 12.
65.
66.

WVHD at 104.
W!-D at 103-04.
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its power. Aristotelian theory and the practices of classical Athens can illustrate
the implications of these points. 67
Aristotle observed that democracies existed on a continuum, from the "extreme" democracy of unlimited citizen rule to citizen polities limited by fundamental laws. The former, "pure" democracy, is a deviation from an ideal because the assembly acts for its own interests and not for the long-range good of
the polls. If the democratic assembly places its decrees over the written laws, the
result is a "composite monarchy" that acts despotically. 68 The need to restrain
the whims of the demos, to prevent it from acting without limits, was as important as the need to restrain a single tyrant or an oligarchy since they all lead to
the same deviant rule if not limited. To Aristotle, just because the people agree
to something does not make it legal, and it certainly does not make it good. For
example, redistribution of the property of the rich by the poor is wrong; it destroys the polis because it destroys justice, despite any contrary resolution by the
majority. Consequently, rule by the consensus of the assembly must be limited. 69
In practice, the fifth-century Athenian demos ostracized a series of political
enemies, ordered the city of Mytilene destroyed and then repented, destroyed
the cities of Melos and Scione, killed six of her own victorious generals and then
turned on the prosecutors, and sentenced Socrates to death. The writer Xenophon presented eloquently the political issue central to the trial of the generals.
He recounts that Socrates himself, and others, had challenged the legality of the
trial, showing that it violated fundamental laws, and refused to countenance it.
Those dissenters were threatened with death along with the generals; this effectively eliminated any limits to the power of the assembly. Xenophon tells us that
the greater number of people cried out from the back of the assembly that it was
monstrous that the people not be able to get what they wanted. The result was
the death of the generals and the loss of the war within two years. 70 The people,
however, had a consensus, and they got what they wanted.
The Athenians soon learned that the power of the people had to be defined
and limited. In the last decade of the fifth century, the Athenians appointed
citizens to re-inscribe the ancient laws of Athens. They developed the conceptual differentiation between a decree of the assembly (psephisma) and law (nomos).
A decree was passed by the consensus of the assembly, to which any citizen
could make any proposal, but this consensus was subordinated to the written

67. The major discussion is at Politics 4.4 (cited in note 7). The pitfalls involved in citing Aristotle in
support of any modern political position are legion. Most of all, he was writing in a polls context, describing phenomena in a small community.
68. Aristotle, Politics 4.4 1292al1-25.
69. Aristotle, Politics 3.6 1281a14-1281b5. "Communitarian" interpretations that violate the nonredistribution factor are suspect. For the question of Aristotle's views of redistribution and property, see
Fred D. Miller, Jr., Nature,Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics 309-31 (Clarendon 1995).
70. For an account of the trial, see Xenophon, Hellenica 1.7 (Harvard 1947) (Carleton L. Brownson,
trans).
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law. A decree had to be consistent with the law, and if they disagreed, the law
took precedence. In practice, the Athenians put in place procedures for changing the law that were distinct from the procedures for passing a decree. Any
proposed decree, for example, could be opposed by any citizen. Such a challenge would turn the proposal over to legal review, a procedure conducted before jurors sworn to uphold the law. This was a prerequisite to any debates
about passing the decree. To change a law, however, required a review before a
jury in the first instance.71
The whole point of constitutional principles is to define the powers of the
government and to constrain its institutions from reaching beyond those powers. Failing to uphold these limits results in the destruction of individuals by a
tyranny of the majority.72 By attempting to interject open-endedness and consensus into constitutional principles, Nussbaum undercuts the very basis of constitutional government, which is designed to limit such actions. Consequently,
constitutional change is procedurally very different from changes in the laws. As
Aristotle says, in a sense, where the laws do not rule there is no constitution,
since there is no defined order apart from popular whims. 73 Democracy becomes a license for the dominant group to redistribute the lives of its individual
citizens rather than a limitation upon the powers of the majority over individuals.
A further point: even in a democracy a particular law does not have "the actual agreement of all the citizens." The proponents of law did not agree to the
killing of the generals in Athens, and those who voted to acquit Socrates did not
agree to the hemlock. A focus group should not be confused with the population of a nation. The former are present because they accept Nussbaum's basic
approach and the propriety of passing such proposals upon themselves and
others. They can walk out if they do not like what is happening. The individuals
in a nation may not accept such proposals, and they cannot leave if the vote
goes against them. They are coerced into acting according to the decision. This
is true even for a single individual who does not agree that her money should be
taxed and redistributed. An injustice against an individual is an injustice.
Under a constitutional government the alternatives before the people are legitimated by their coherence with the government powers as defined by the
constitution. Ultimately if each person is to be something other than a means to
the ends of every other person, the people must agree that the powers of gov71. For discussion, see Mogens Herman Hansen, The Soveregn_* of the Peopl's Court in Athens in the
Fourth Centg!y B.C. and the Public Action Against UnconstitutionalProposals 28-65 (Odense 1974) (Jorgen
Raphaelsen and Sonia Holboll, trans); S.C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law 18-19, 56-60, 294-95 (Clarendon 1993). Aristotle mentions the two levels, "impeachments for imegal procedure, proceedings against
inexpedient legislation," in Athenian Constitution 59.2 (Harvard 1952) (H. Rackham, trans).
72. For the assembly unlimited by laws as a "composite tyrant," see Atistotle, Politics 4.4 1292a1173.

Aristotle, Polities4.4 1292a32.
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ernment are not open to ever-widening increase. Constitutionalism cannot be
advanced by repudiating the idea of constitutionalism through an open-ended
consensus to increase government powers.
Nussbaum does not elaborate a theory of constitutional principles that will
help those who need protections against physical coercion the most. By elevating the consensus over philosophically validated constitutional principles, including an understanding of the purpose of a constitution, she leaves the ultimate content of the constitution open to majority vote. This ignores the fact
that an injustice is directed at an individual and that an individual needs protection against all groups, especially the majority. The generals in Athens were individuals oppressed by the majority group and used as a means to the ends of
those leading the majority. Nussbaum's use of the consensus goes against her
claim to be concerned with individuals. By directing her capabilities solely at
those in need and failing to protect those who actually flourish, she sets up anyone who actually flourishes as an object of expropriation. This may not be her
intention, but this is what her approach to the constitution means. The result
would be the destruction of flourishing wherever it became real.

VI. NUSSBAUTM'S "MISSING PERSONS"74
Women and Human Development positions its discussions of property, choice,
preference and flourishing almost exclusively in relation to poor people. Nussbaum claims to base her approach on the individual, explicitly rejecting any
claim by any group to dominate individuals. 75 She rejects, for instance, Becker's
view of the family as an "organic unit held together by altruism." 76 However,
given that Nussbaum has omitted from her discussions those who must provide
the material resources necessary for her proposals, her claim to individualism
can be evaluated only after those persons are introduced into the practical implementation of the plan. She narrows the debate to matters such as need, preference and capability without asking whether it is appropriate for governments
to enforce these claims. Again, because she does not distinguish the terms of political enforcement from moral persuasion, she is unclear as to which of her
proposals are to be enforced and which are not.
Nussbaum affirms her commitment to her version of liberty by an extensive
examination of various preference theories and a critique of "welfarism" as an
alternative to the capabilities approach. She uses her distinction between capabilities and functions to claim that she supports personal liberties and rights, and
to show that her plan is not "paternalistic":
74.

"Missing persons" is a term that Nussbaum attributes to Sen, that there are many "missing

women" in the world based on political and social conditions. See WIHD at 3-4. The "missing persons" that
I wish to consider, however, are those omitted from Nussbaum's discussions.

75.
76.

WIHD at 2, 6, 247.
WHD at 248.
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For if we were to take functioning itself as the goal of public policy, pushing citizens into functioning in a single determinate manner, the liberal pluralist would
rightly judge that we were precluding many choices that citizens may make in accordance with their own conceptions of the good, and perhaps violating their
rights. A deeply religious person may prefer not to be well nourished, but to engage in strenuous fasting. Whether for religious or for other reasons, a person may
prefer a celibate life to one containing sexual expression. A person may prefer to
work with an intense dedication that precludes recreation and play. Am I declaring, by my very use of the list, that such lives are not worthy of the dignity of the
human being? And am I instructing government to nudge or push people into
77
functioning of the requisite sort, no matter what they prefer?

Nussbaum goes on to say that the answers to the posed questions must be no,
given that practical reason, which is a central capability, must be allowed to
function. For political purposes, "it is appropriate that we shoot for capabilities"
only.78 "A person who has opportunities for play can always choose a workaholic life.., once the stage is fully set, the choice is up to them."7 9 To force
people to function is to deny their liberty.
Yet observe who is missing in this account. Those who are to provide whatever that open-ended list demands are to be constrained in any necessary way,
such as through high taxation and expropriation. Once a woman in America has
worked from January through April to pay her obligations to strangers in another country, those strangers are free to reject what she has provided for them.
Her ability to use practical reason is not a concern. Only the rights of those who
are provided with the fruits of her labors are to be respected. It would be "paternalistic" to demand that they use what she provides, but not so to demand
that she provide it.80 Nussbaum's identification of each person as an end, as
defined by the shifting standards of "threshold" and "equality," without considering who is to provide the capabilities, reduces those who actually flourish to
the status of means to those ends.
Practical reason here seems to mean rational thought as defined by Nussbaum's conceptual and moral limits. A woman has the moral right to free
choice, as long as the limits to that choice are held to be within Nussbaum's
definition of need as the standard of value. To refuse to follow one's duty to the
consensus would be a breach of moral norms and deserving of sanction. Nussbaum approvingly cites John Harsanyi for his move away from "welfarism."
Harsanyi states that "we must exclude [from the social-utility function] all clearly
antisocial preferences, such as sadism, envy, resentment, and malice." Nussbaum
77. WHD at 87.
78. WHD at 87.
79. IPD at 87-88.
80. See Nussbaum, Sex andSodaljusice at 218 (cited in note 14). Nussbaum speaks of "objectification," meaning "treating as a thing something that is really not a thing." She lists seven ways to treat a
person as a thing: instrumentality, denial of autonomy, inertness, fungibility, violability, ownership, and
denial of subjectivity. Several of them can apply to any woman who does not agree to Nussbaum's plan.
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cites as "fascinating" his justification for this, which is based on the idea of a
"moral community" based on "a general goodwill and human sympathy." Harsanyi continues, "A person displaying ill will toward others does remain a member of this community, but not with his whole personality. That part of his personality that harbours these hostile antisocial feelings must be excluded from
membership, and has no claim for a hearing when it comes to defining our concept of social utility. 81 This may or may not be a fair reading of Harsanyi, but it
is difficult to see how Nussbaum's use of "resentment" here should not be extended to include any resentment against the demands of the consensus. In
other words, a woman who resented being taxed to pay for the needs of strangers is to have her desires consciously excluded. Nussbaum's version of the
"moral community" will in practice belong only to those who accept the moral
commandments of the consensus.
Again, Nussbaum's desire to erase the desires of women in the developed
nations from the discussion is more than an author's thematic limit upon her
work. It is central to her methodology and has important consequences for how
she approaches her project. For example, that the government cannot both restrain a religious custom of female subordination (e.g., child marriage) and protect the religious freedom of those who wish to practice such customs leads
Nussbaum to "balance" various capabilities. She admits that this contrasts with
her claim that the capabilities cannot be balanced, but she justifies it by balancing "above the threshold level."8 2 In a significant omission, however, Nussbaum
sees no problem in the proposition that the government can both protect the
freedom to own property and redistribute that property to strangers, since she
does not discuss the effect on those who own the property.
This approach actually slants Nussbaum away from solutions to the problems she sees and bolsters certain predetermined conclusions irrespective of
those solutions. A particular use of statistics in the opening pages of her account
is telling. Nussbaum supports her conclusion that women are treated unequally
in the world by combining a biological conclusion with a statistic. She accepts,
as an undocumented biological fact, that women should live slightly longer than
men if given equal nutrition and health care. This means that sex ratios in nations should favor women slightly; we should expect approximately 102.2
women per 100 men, and this ratio appears in sub-Saharan Africa. The ratio in
India is actually 92.7 to 100, a pattern that obtains in much of the undeveloped
world, which means that millions of women are missing in the world today.8 3
Nussbaum selects sub-Saharan Africa as the "baseline of comparison with
81.
WHD at 127-28, citing John C. Harsanyi, Moraliy and the Theogy of RationalBehaviour, in Amartya
Sen and Bernard Williams, eds, Utilitarianism ad Beyond 39-62 (Cambridge 1991).
82. IVHD at 211.
83. WIID at 3-4, citing Jean Drhze and Amartya Sen, Hnger and Public Action (Clarendon 1989);
Jean Drbze and Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportuniot (Oxford 1995). Nussbaum
cites Sen's figure of 100 million missing women in the world today.
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India since it might be thought inappropriate to compare developed to developing countries." 84 Again, her focus is not on whether such a comparison is, infact,
warranted, but rather what is thought about this comparison. To make the comparison would, presumably, upset the allies she needs to have her plan accepted.
She then notes that the ratio of women to men in Europe and North America is
actually 105 to 100. These facts are placed in a footnote.85 But applying this statistic to America using Nussbaum's own method, women in America are actually better off than men and there are millions of missing men in America.
Nussbaum neither considers this nor examines her own method and premises
behind it.
The comparison with sub-Saharan Africa is also telling. She claims that this
area matches the biological formula for the length of life given equal access to
resources; it is what "we would expect." 86 However, what are the other statistics
for that area? At the beginning of Women, Culture and Development, Nussbaum

places a seventeen-page chart of demographic statistics, broken down by country and derived from 1993 U.N. Development Reports. 87 In the summary row,
the statistics for sub-Saharan Africa include an average life expectancy of 53.6
years, versus 77.9 in industrialized countries, and a maternal mortality rate of
690 per 100,000 live births, versus 26 for industrial countries. Corresponding
literacy rates are 37 percent versus 99 percent. The obvious question is: what is
the validity of the biological statistic cited, given that the countries with it have
this level of mortality?
A comparison with developed countries is entirely appropriate, for this is
where flourishing has been attained. If someone wants to know how women
actually flourish she should examine places where this has actually happened.
Such an examination would have to ask why the United States is so qualitatively
different from India. In constitutional terms, this means asking why women
have exceeded the expected biological ratio in the United States even though, according to Nussbaum, the United States Constitution does not include clauses
such as affirmative action. In contrast, why is India still at such an undeveloped
level even though affirmative action and redistribution are written into the Indian constitution and considered to be compatible with liberty?88
Such an examination would acknowledge the fact that the creation of wealth
on a scale that makes conditions in North America virtually incommensurable
with India today did not begin with the importation of material values from
other countries, or from a wealthy native elite, since there was no such wealth
anywhere in the world. The reladve differences in wealth existing in the eight84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
the Indian

WIHD at 3 n 5.
WIHD at 3 n 5.
WHID at 3.
Nussbaum, Women, Culture,and DetlopmentTable 1 (cited in note 14).
WHD at 39, 55 (on the Indian and American constitutions). WI1D at 39 (noting particularly that
constitution was adopted "by overwhelming consensus").
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eenth century were, in modern terms, all below the absolute threshold demanded
today. Health care is an obvious example; no one had antibiotic drugs. This,
however, did not stop people from working to develop economic resources, and
did not stop millions of immigrants from risking their lives to get to America in
order to flourish. Such a perspective is a serious challenge to the redistributive
model of development that Nussbaum uses.
When she does compare India to the United States, Nussbaum shifts between standards of evaluation. On the one hand, she considers the lack of "sex
equality" in India to exist because the women suffer real hardships, despite an
"equal rights amendment" to the constitution. On the other hand, "sex equality"
cannot be credited to America because the United States Constitution has no
such amendment, despite the fact that the women are so well off that comparison with India is inappropriate. A reader may question whether such an
amendment is necessarily good for women and why Nussbaum still advocates
such an amendment, given that women in developed countries without such an
amendment have risen so much higher than those in developing countries with
one.
A fuller comparison of India with America may reveal that the establishment, in legally enforceable writing, of political freedom in the form of negative
rights (to act without fear of physical force and not the promise of redistribution
based on need) was the primary factor that enabled the great wealth creation of
nineteenth-century America and the rapid distribution of that wealth. Such freedom also allowed original flaws in the Constitution, such as slavery and the denial of the vote for women, to be corrected. This challenges Nussbaum's subordination of individual rights to capabilities and her redefinition of rights into
claims to economic resources. The simple fact is that Nussbaum cannot consistently support both property rights and legalized global redistribution of property, because a person cannot both maintain his property by right and have it
taken. Nor can a person strive to attain the highest flourishing possible in the
face of unchosen limits imposed upon the striving itself. Had Nussbaum's plan
been accepted in the early 1800s, efforts at industrialization would have been
expropriated in favor of equality in non-mechanized farm life.
VI1. CONCLUSION
Most people would agree that shelter, thinking, contemplating the good, fulfilling work, sexual satisfaction and recreation are good for individuals and that a
flourishing person should pursue them. But these become bromides when combined with trivialities and stated as central moral values. We should not enshrine
them as law and elevate them over rights casually. We need to know why they
are important, what facts give rise to them, and in what terms an individual can
realize them. As constitutional proposals we need to understand whether the
government should attempt to guarantee them and if so why, and what the im-
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plications are for everyone, including the people who produce the resources that
make them possible. Flourishing is an achievable ideal but, contrary to Nussbaum, history indicates that the political requirements are first and foremost
liberty, freedom from the initiation of force, and the protection of property
rights.8 9 The capabilities are otherwise private matters.
This review has not addressed many aspects of Professor Nussbaum's work.
It has not engaged with nuances of difference between her views and those of
other theorists. It has not compared her theoretical understanding of specific
concepts, such as rights, with others. Nor has it dealt with many of the applications addressed by her, particularly religion, the emotions, and the family. It
would be very fruitful to consider the implications of these applications for the
persons that the capabilities approach does not discuss. It would also be
interesting to examine the success stories she presents, such as the SelfEmployed Women's Association (SEWA) in India, and to ask if they depend on
constitutional change or enforced redistribution at all.90
The problems that Nussbaum engages are centuries old and continental in
scope. Her case studies show people coping with situations that are often all but
hopeless. The importance of the issues underlying these problems makes it all
the more necessary to ask why American women have risen so far so fast. In
answering this question it is vital not to attack the very foundations that made
that advancement possible. Rather than assuming that redistribution is the ideal,
we should consider the importance of property rights for Indian women. This
will require a clear philosophical statement of each person's inalienable right to
strive for flourishing rather than a specious guarantee of their capability to do
SO.

89. Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto sees property rights as vital to understanding the difference between developed and undeveloped countries. He calculates that "the total value of real estate held
but not legally owned by the poor of the Third World and former communist nations is at least $9.3 trillion." He concludes that establishing firm rights to property is an essential step to using this wealth as
capital for development. Hemando de Soto, The Mysiey of Capita" Why Capita/im Tdamphs in the West and
FailsEveywhere Else 35 (Basic 2000). Nussbaum notes that 94 percent of women who work in India are
"self-employed" in "cottage industries, agricultural labor" and other work. WHD 15-17.
90. VHD at 15-17. See generally Kalima Rose, Where Women are Leaders: The SEWA Movement in India (Zed 1992).

